Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 24

Issue 2

Article 8

1936

Agency--Distinction Between "Within the Course of Employment"
and "Within the Scope of Employment"
Howard H. Whitehead
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Agency Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Whitehead, Howard H. (1936) "Agency--Distinction Between "Within the Course of Employment" and
"Within the Scope of Employment"," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 24: Iss. 2, Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol24/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

STuDENT

Noms

211

charities as having become unworthy of the property. Hence by T's
will the beneficiaries got a defeasible title to the property. Now as
the only way the contingency can arise is by W expressly saying that
she deems the charities unworthy," and as she did not so state in her
will that they were, no power arises for her to execute, hence only
her'own property passes by her will.
It has been held that a contrary intention will not be implied from
that fact that the testator may have been in doubt as to the amount
of the income, which the property passing under the will, would produce.n So In the principal case the fact that T made certain small
legacies on the condition of the value of the estate not falling below
$100,000 did not show a contrary intention not to exercise the power.
The court properly suggested that probably T had in mind at that
time the fluctuations of the value of the property and was not referring to his own small estate he had apart from that under the
power.
H~ARY Poran DiEs.

AGENCY-DISTINCTION BETWEEN "WITHIN THE COURSE OF
EMPLOYMENT" AND "WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
EMPLOYMENT"
One Is faced with a somewhat confusing problem when trying to
differentiate, both in point of fact and in point of law, between the
terms, "within the course of employment" and "within the scope of
employment."
Text-writers on agency and the courts in their decisions are pleased to use first one and then the other, until a student
or even a practitioner who is confronted with an agency problem, is
ultimately baffled as to the exact meaning and application of the two
terms as tests of the master's liability for the torts of his agent. In
volume two, section 1879 of Mechem's work on Agency, Mr. Mechem
selects the phrase "within the course of his employment" and uses it
to mean and include, admittedly for the want of a better term, the
separate and distinct meanings of the two phrases, "within the course
of his employment" and "within the scope of his employment". The
meaning of the words in the former phrase is as that of those in the
"Garman v. Glass, 197 Pa. 101, 64 AtI. 923 (1900).
G devised
property to his wife for life, with remainder to others, with provision
that, if they should not be obedient to her, he revokes the devise to
them and empowers her to devise the property. The court said that
there must be an affrmative decision and declaration of their disobedience, to entitle her to exercise the power, and it is not shown by
a devise by her of the "residue" of her property; and until determination that the contingency on which the power may be exercised had
arisen. This is true notwithstanding a statute embodying the Massachusetts rule. The court said that the statute does not apply.
2'Art's Student League of N. Y. v. Hinkley, 31 Fed. (2d) 469
(1929).
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latter-something felt but not easily explained. When speaking of an
act occurring in the course of employment one thinks of an act done
by the servant during the time embraced by the terms of his employment, and within the area either expressly or impliedly denoted by
those terms. But when one thinks of acts done within the scope of
employment, he thinks of acts which come probably within the
bounds of the course of employment, but which acts may or may not
be authorized by the master, either expressly or impliedly. This is
the distinction that Mechem makes or seems to make; however, in
spite of this, he fuses the two terms. They are not fusable, each being
independent of the other as to meaning.
In the American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Agency1
the compilers choose to make the term "scope of employment" allcomprehensive, as Mechem does the term "course of employment." To
quote from the Restatement:
1. Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but
only if:
(a) It is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) It occurs substantially within the authorized time and space
limits; and
(c) It is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master.
2. It is a question of fact, depending upon the extent of departure, whether or not an act, as performed in its setting of time and
place, is so different in kind from that authorized, or has so little
relation to the employment, that it is not within its scope.
Section (a) obviously would seem to mean "if it is within the
scope of employment'. Naturally the servant would only be employed
to do what he was authorized to do and vice versa. If a servant does
an act which he is neither expressly nor impliedly authorized to do,
he is without the scope of employment, by the great majority of
cases.$ Yet if the act is within the time and space limits of the employment, it is the writer's firm conviction that the servant would be
acting within the course of employment. It is difficult to see how, if
an act is within the course of employment, but without the scope of
employment, that act can be described by one term which embodies
the full meaning of both the above terms.
Section (b) seems to mean "if it is within the course of employment." In a recent Kentucky case' it is said "that to render the master liable for the agent's torts, they must have been committed while
carrying out the master's business, and the tort of a servant is
'within the course of his employment' where the servant performing
Restatement, Agency (1934), Sec. 228.
2 Burgess v. Standard Oil Co., 262 Fed. 767 (1920); Smith v. Dawson, 206 Ky. 107, 266 S. W. 926 (1924).
' Brooks, et al. v." Gray-Von Allmen Sanitary Milk Co.j 211 Ky. 462,
at 466, 277 S. W. 816 (1925).
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it is endeavoring to promote his master's business within the scope
of actual or apparent authority conferred on him for that purpose;
but, if he steps aside from the master's business for however short a
time to do acts not connected with such business relation, he is not
acting 'within the course of his employment.'" The Kentucky decision, as can be seen, conforms with Mr. Mechem in holding that the
oervant was not acting in the course of his employment when he did
unauthorized acts, even though those acts occurred within the time
and space limits of his employment. Logically an act occurring within
these limits should be held to have occurred within the course of employment, which is, in effect, the theme the writer is endeavoring to
develop. This is the same as saying that "line of employment" and
"course of employment" are the same; and that would seem to be the
logical conclusion both from a grammatical and a factual standpoint.
Only two Kentucky cases seem to make any distinction at all
between the phrases.'
5
There is dictum in an Illinois case which, at first blush, would
seem to rebut the whole proposition which is here presented. "An
employee cannot be acting within the scope of his employment unless
he is acting in the course of his employment". The foregoing seems
to indicate that the one is collateral with the other. But reverse this
sentence-"an employee cannot be acting within the course of his employment unless he is acting within the scope of his employment." The
fallacy may at once be observed. Again the question arises-how can
the test be possibly applied in its present form? We will discuss two
cases and then see what Impression they leave in regard to the reversed statement of the above quoted dictum. In a fairly recent Mississippi case,$ as well as in many otherst is found the proposition
that the master is not liable for acts done by the servants outside the
scope of employment. We will judge from the facts in the Mississippi
case whether the defendant's servant was acting in the course of his
employment. The plaintiff was in the depot of the defendant to assist
her father in getting aboard a train. In broad daylight the baggage
master exposed his private parts to the plaintiff and proceeded to
urinate on her clothes and her person, before she could remove herself. In the appellate court judgment was given for the defendant
company, giving the rule that "the master is not liable for the acts of
the servant when done outside the scope of his employment, and not
in furtherance of the master's business, unless such act be directed
to be done or ratified by the master". In the case cited supra, note 5,

' Cinn., N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Rue, 142 Ky. 694, 134 S. W. 1144
(1911); Smith v. Dawson, 206 Ky. 107, 266 S. W. 926 (1924).
(This
'Orr v. Thompson Coal Co., 219 Ill. App. 116, 120 (1920).
case holds that course of employment is a triple test and relates to
time, place, and workmen's conduct.)
'Southern Ry. Co. v. Garrett, 101 So. 348 (1924).
TTraynor v. Keefe Const. Co., et al., 199 Iowa 575, 202 N. W. 218
(1925); Lancaster v. Campbell, 218 S. W. 550 (1920).

I- L. J.-8
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It was laid down that the primary test to determine the master's liability for the negligent act of his servant is whether the act was
within the scope of his employment or whether the servant was at the
time of the act at liberty from the service of his master and not engaged in doing his master's business, but was pursuing his own Interests exclusively. In this case was not the servant acting within the
time limits and the space limits of his employment, and was he not in
the direct line of his employment if he was in the 'defendant's baggage
car and moving out of the depot with the train? That seems to be
the correct conclusion. But the master can hardly have authorized
the act and the court stated that he did not by saying that the act was
without the scope of employment. It must be said that in this case
the servant was acting within the course of employment but without
the scope of employment. In a Minnesota case it was held that the
employer was not liable for slander by the employee in the course of
his employment. The case is the perfect illustration. The slander is
stated to have been uttered in the course of employment. Can the
master have authorized expressly or impliedly this slander? The
slander is said to have been uttered with a view to furtherance of the
employer's business, and for a purpose not personal to himself by
the servant. This, however, cannot even remotely be classified as
Implied authority on the part of the employer. In support of this
proposition we return to the case cited supra, note 5, which holds that
the master is'liable for the servant's acts within the scope of employment and the limits of implied authority however erroneous, mistaken,
or malicious, but not for acts beyond such limit, unless expressly
authorized or subsequently adopted and ratified. Many state decisions
support this holding.
Returning to the statement made in the Illinois case that "an employee cannot be acting within the scope of his employment unless he
is acting in the course of his employment", let it be said that there is
probably a fallacy, although, beyond the discussion of a single case, we
will not attempt to conclusively decide that point. A Kentucky case"O
holds that where a servant rode home on his master's motorcycle,
which he was authorized during the day to use, and injured plaintiff,
the master was not liable. We must grant that the plaintiff was acting outside the course of his employment. The day's work was over
and the servant was conceivably far away from the area he traveled
on the machine while carrying out his master's business. Hence, he
1
was out of the time and space limits prescribed by his employment."
$Manion v. Jewel Tea Co., 135 Minn. 250, 160 N. W. 767 (1915).
'Karas v. Burns Bros., 94 N. J. L. 59, 110 Atl. 567 (1920); Fischman v. Sanitary Toilet Co., 112 Misc. Rep. 500, 182 N. Y. S. 809 (1920);
Besnar v. Amer. Ry. Ex. Co., 115 Misc. Rep. 515, 188 N. Y. S. 786
(1921).
1
'Keck's Admin. v. Louisville Gas and Electric Co., 179 Ky. 314,
200 S. W. 452 (1918).
11(Master is 'civilly liable for torts of the servant done in the
course of his employment.)* Paiewonsky v. Joffe, 101 N. J. L. 521, 129
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But might he not have been in the scope of his authority? His master may have expressly authorized him to ride the machine home; or
he may have ratified impliedly by saying nothing about it, after several repetitions by the servant. Of course, these propositions prove
nothing, .unsupported by proof, but they tend to uphold the theory
that a servant's employment should be composed of two unrelated and
non-collateral legal concepts, I. e., "course of employment" and "scope
of employment", and that, as tests for the n aster's liability for the
torts of his servant, they must be applied separately, as the master
may be liable under one test and not liable under the other. And, if
the master may be liable under one test and not under the other, it is
illogical to apply singly a test which, according to the texts cited in
the beginning, seeks to fuse the two concepts.
I# one case" the street railway company was held liable for the
tort of the servant, which in no wise, impliedly or expressly or by subsequent ratification, could be held to be authorized. The servant was
driving the car on its tracks and saw the plaintiff's dog on the said
tracks in plenty of time to stop. He did not stop but maliciously increased the car's speed and ran over the dog. The master was held
liable on the ground that he had placed the servant in such position
that he could commit this malicious act. This clearly is liability for
an act occurring in the course of employment, but without the scope
of employment. Another series of cases 2 held the railway company
liable where the engineer of its locomotive maliciously blew his whistle and scared the horses of the plaintiff. This liability was based
on the placing in the hands of the gervant a dangerous instrumentality. No authority could be implied here, and the act did occur in the
course of employment. It may be safely declared that the master
would not have been liable if the engineer had, after working hours,
sneaked out the locomotive and committed the said tort. Hence, here,
"course of employment" was the test.
In an article by Roy Moreland on Workmen's Compensation Acts"
is found the proposition that "in course of employment" refers to the
time, place and circumstances under which the act occurred. A Kentucky case also contains this definition. Nothing could be found in
either the Law Journal article or the Kentucky case intimating that
the term "in course of employment" had any reference to "scope of
employment", as to acts authorized, either expressly or impliedly.
While the article and the case dealt with the term in relation to laAtl. 142 (1925); Michael v. Southern Lumber Co., 101 N. J. L. 1, 127
Atl. 580 (1925); Bush v. Sinclair Rooney & Co., 207 App. Div. 699,
201 N. Y. S. 804 (1923).
"Columbus Ry. Co. v. Woolfolk, 128 Ga. 631, 58 S. E. 152 (1907).
"Toledo, Etc., R. Co. v. Harmon, 47 Ill. 298 (1868); Chicago, Etc.,
R. Co. v. Dickson, 63 Ill. 151 (1872); Regan v. Reed, 96 Ill. App. 460
(1901); Billman v. R. Company, 76 Ind. 166, 40 Am. Rep. 230 (1881).
(There is a negligible list of contra cases.)
2,15 Ky. Law Journal, 200, 207,
"Hollenbach v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W. 152 (1918).
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bility of the master to the servant himself, there is no apparent reason for changing the meaning of the term to include scope of employment, when dealing with the liability of the master to a third person for the tort of the servant.
From the foregoing we have seen that the two factors determining the liability of the master for the torts of his servant are severable in meaning and operation, one from the other, and cannot properly be applied to a set of facts in a singular form. The said set of
facts may fall within one term and without the other. Both tests may
apply to some cases. In others the master may be liable for acts occurring in the course of employment but without the scope of employment; in still others he may be liable for acts occurring within the
scope of employment but without the course of employment, of
course, as in the motorcycle case, where one test applies the other
may be implied. The court might argue that since the authority was
extended to include the servant's ride home, the time and space
limits of the employment might also be implied to extend that far.
This would admit of the application of Mr. Mechem's single test. To
a careful thinker such reasoning must appear untenable. The master's liability is not being contested in this case, but only that it
should be based on the double test. His liability is based on his subsequent ratification, using for the moment the illustrative hypothesis
set forth above, and on that alone.
A standardization of terminology in treating this particular subject would not go amiss. The tests for the liability of the master for
the torts of his servant which have been separately treated herein
should be separately stated and separately applied to the cases as they
come up. Such a course would undoubtedly result in clarification of
the subject for the student.
HowAnD H. WITEHEAD.

EQUITY-MUTUALITY

AS A BASIS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF

A testator bequeathed his estate, consisting of corporate stock, to
his wife. One half thereof was to go to his mother, sister and brothers should his wife marry again. Thereafter the widow contracted to
sell the stock; and upon the purchaser's refusal to perform she brought
suit for specific performance of the contract. The court granted specific performance without stating the ground upon which it was
given.'
Assuming that the widow had the right to sell the stock, upon
which ground was the remedy given, mutuality of remedy or the inadequacy of the remedy at law? The court's silence does not obviate
the uncertainty of its view. The question remains, will the Kentucky courts grant specific performance to one party of the contract
'Harris, et al. v. New, et al., 167 Ky. 262, 180 S. W. 375 (1915).

